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In *THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY* 4.113, 161-162 reference was made to evidence, brought out in the pages of *The Nation*, that at Dartmouth College men with training in Greek had furnished 54 per cent of the successful scientific students there, whereas only 20 per cent of the successful scientific students had come from the ranks of those primarily trained in science and primarily devoted thereto. In *The Nation* for September 7 last, Professor J. W. Hewitt of Wesleyan University brings forward similar evidence in connection with that University.

In 1907 Wesleyan omitted Greek from the requirements for the B.A. degree. Of course there was a drop, very marked from the beginning, in the number of students presenting Greek for admission, and an increase in the number of candidates for the degree of B.S. Professor Hewitt has examined the records of the classes of 1904-1913, in the years 1904-1911. He gives a very interesting table showing the extent to which students of Greek, students of Latin, and the candidates for the B.S. have won or failed to win honors and prizes of various sorts. This table, which we have not space to reprint, we commend to the careful attention of our readers.

We give in full Professor Hewitt's comments on the facts brought out by the table (they are well worth the space they take):

I. Concerning the science students the table reveals the following facts:

(1) Some years ago they were winning their share of honors in general scholarship and of elections to Phi Beta Kappa.

(2) Their numbers even then showed a greater tendency to shrink in the four years of the course than did those of the classical men.

(3) They have never won a "high honor".

(4) They have frequently, particularly in recent years, won only a small fraction of "honors" and of elections to Phi Beta Kappa.

(5) They have won no prizes in group II, which consists of history, economics, and philosophy; never their whole share, and frequently much less than their share, in group I (the languages, omitting the classics), and in group III (the sciences).

(6) They never represent the university on the debating teams.

(7) They tend increasingly to form the backbone of the baseball, football, and basketball teams.

(8) They seldom attain the responsibility of a management.

II. Of Latin students it may be said that:

(1) There is comparatively little shrinkage in their

numbers in the college course, while the proportion of students who enter with Latin but no Greek tends to increase.

(2) They seldom obtain "high honors", and have sometimes fallen behind the B.S. men in "honors", but not in elections to Phi Beta Kappa.

(3) In capturing prizes they distinctly surpass the science men, particularly in the language group.

III. Of the students of Greek we see:

(1) Their number, proportionately to the size of the class, is steadily decreasing.

(2) The proportion of the "Greeks" who graduate is considerably greater than that of either of the other two classes of students.

(3) They take virtually all the "high honors", and nearly double their share of "honors" and of elections to Phi Beta Kappa.

(4) In the capture of prizes their superiority is greatest in group II, but in the language group (not reckoning the ancient languages) they take more than their share, and usually, though not always, outdo the science men in their own field.

(5) They form the backbone of the debating teams.

(6) They hold about half the important managements.

Certain other pertinent facts not shown in the table may be added here. In the period covered by the survey, honors in special departments were awarded to the number of sixteen. Of these ten went to the Greeks, four to the Latin men, two to the science men. Preliminary honors were granted in two fields only, the classics and mathematics. Ignoring the former as not germane to this discussion, we find that (in our period) honors in mathematics have been granted to twelve men, none of whom was a candidate for the B.S., and only five of whom had not offered Greek for admission.

To draw conclusions from these data is a sore temptation for the teacher of Greek. For the present I forebear, leaving my readers to interpret as they will. This much, however, no one can dispute. For some reason or other the students of Greek, numerically fewer than those of either of the other classes, are more than holding their own in all the distinctly academic activities. The Latin students are inferior to them, but superior to the students of science and of modern languages, who, though usually outnumbering either of the other two classes at entrance, are holding their own in one field only—that of athletics, and have very little share in the management even of that! A better title for this article would perhaps have been *The Inefficiency of the Non-Classical Student*.

An interesting paper, surely, particularly to those who have banished the study of Greek from our schools because they question its efficiency or its helpfulness in practical life.

C. K.

ADDRESS TO THE TRUSTEES OF AMHERST
BY THE CLASS OF 1885

(Concluded from page 4.)

The editorial comments on the proposals contained in the Address of the Class of 1885 to the Trustees of Amherst College contain very much of interest. We have space, however, for but two quotations. First may be noted the following words from *The Evening Post* (of New York) for February 25, 1911:

<The small college> can . . . attain that unity of scholarly interests—with, of course, proper variety—the absence of which is having so benumbing an effect on the larger and more heterogeneous institutions. At a dinner where were present several members of the Faculty of a certain small college which apes notoriously the university system, the talk turned into kindly remembrance of the absent brothers; and said the learned investigator in biology to his neighbor of the physical laboratory: "Do you know that Smith came to me to-day and wanted to know about something in biology; what has a philosopher to do with biology?" It is just that spirit of dispersion that might be eliminated by giving to education, where it can be given, a sure order and hierarchy. And whatever may be said here and there against the "dead languages", however they have been abandoned for easier and seemingly more direct paths to success, there are no studies other than Latin and Greek that can be practically proposed as the center of such a system. Indeed, the committee whose report we are considering makes a strong appeal for their unique value in individual culture and in national life. And there are other indications that such views in regard to the classics are becoming commoner to-day among men of wide knowledge of life and among our professional educators.

The most elaborate and most excellent discussion of the proposals is that printed in *The News* (Indianapolis) for January 21, 1911.

There are two or three very simple truths which ought to be kept in mind by any one who discusses this question. The first is that not all that seems to be progress is progress. Men and society may move, but it may be in the wrong direction . . . The Amherst men—and many agree with them—are profoundly convinced that the changes in education have been decidedly for the worse. The general dissatisfaction with present conditions still further supports this view. Not for years has there been so much unfavorable comment on education as there is at the present time.

As change from the old does not necessarily indicate progress, so recurrence to the old does not indicate a failure to progress. . . . It is quite clear that reversion to the old is very often the truest and noblest sort of progress . . . The old paths were blazed out by men who had had much experience with life, and some knowledge of human nature. They were not mistaken about everything, are not false guides. A thing is not good because it is old, but then neither is a thing good because it is new. There is, however, a certain presumption to be indulged in favor of the old—of what has been tried and tested. That is a truth of which we, in our passion for change and innovation, make far

too little. Our educational reformers have given it almost no weight, their theory being that whatever is, is wrong. Progress, therefore, does not necessarily mean going ahead; it may, and often does, mean going back—back to old and forgotten truths and principles.

The third general principle which it is desired to lay down is that history can have no value to any man who is unwilling to profit by its teaching, or unable to catch inspiration from the great lives that were lived long ago. If we accept the theory that truth is new-born in every generation, that knowledge, which can come only from patient study or painful experience, is a matter of special revelation to a chosen few who call themselves reformers, then, indeed, the study of history is the most futile of all things. . . . But . . . for instruction as to what we should do or for warning as to what we should not do, the teaching of the past is of the highest possible value. Cultured men ought to stand steadfastly against all attempts to create a schism in life, against the efforts to discredit the experiences of the ages. The surest sign that a man is cultured is his ability to "see life steadily and see it whole", and his deep and loyal reverence for a great and sacred past. . . . There was life on this planet before we were born, and it affects and influences present life more profoundly than we, in our satisfaction with our own achievements, always realize. Much of our research is devoted to the rediscovering of lost and forgotten truth. Truth is not always an affair of the future.

So the men of Amherst ask us, at least by implication, to reconsider our hastily delivered judgment on the old scheme of education. Did we condemn it too hastily and without sufficient warrant? Is or is it not true that the present plan was at first considered to be merely an experiment? If so, has the experiment proved successful? Probably not one of these questions can be answered without some qualification, unless it be the first. It does seem as if we had been too sure of ourselves when we overthrew the old curriculum. But it must be recognized that it was the product of two forces, one of which has, to a certain extent, ceased to operate. Largely the product of a time when the common people were not expected to be educated, it was based on the theory that learning was for the few. Greek and Latin were necessary to men who were to have anything to do with affairs. So the old system grew up, and it met the needs of the time. As it then existed it does not fit the needs of our time, and the men who four or five hundred years ago followed the scheme then in vogue, would, were they alive to-day, be the first to admit the need for readaptation. For they were progressive men, many of them the heretics of their day. But this is far from being the whole story. For the classical course was not simply a development—it was also a manufactured thing. Great men saw that it was good, and that under it an admirable training could be had. This was true even in this country, so late as thirty years ago. The writer in the *Yale paper* must have had in mind such men as Porter, Woolsey, Thacher, Packard, Dwight and the rest, to say nothing of the great roll of alumni nurtured on the old wisdom. These men were not mere stupid reactionaries and Bourbons. On the contrary, they profoundly believed in the virtue of classical and literary study. Such authorities are not to be despised. They all had power and personality, and they themselves,

and scores and hundreds of others who might be named, were the products of the old training. The idea that they should now be overruled by a few technical men seeking to magnify themselves is utterly preposterous. To them the "old paths" seemed to lead to the highest and most fruitful truth.

But there is other testimony, and of the highest value. It is to be found in the lives of those great men of affairs trained in the English universities. The Balliol type is perfectly well known. Some of the greatest men who have served England were trained at that famous college, and they have been men who "did things"—prime ministers, lawyers, judges, administrators, viceroys, and governors. The present prime minister, Mr. Asquith, is himself a Balliol man. Mr. Balfour, the leader of the Opposition, was educated at Eton, and Trinity College, Cambridge. Lord Rosebery is an Oxford man. Gladstone, Salisbury, Macaulay, and a host of others were all fed on the old studies. In our own country such men as President Taft, President Hadley of Yale, former President Wilson of Princeton—now, happily, Governor of New Jersey—Governor Baldwin of Connecticut, Chief Justice White, and many others prominent in public affairs, were all educated classically. Judging the training both by those who advocated it and those who have been bred from it, surely we must say that it has much in its favor. The question is, are we developing such men to-day? Undoubtedly, but we are not developing them by the new methods—and that is the point. Our product is becoming more and more specialized. We are training men away from public service rather than toward it. The man who takes a four year course in science, giving only such attention as he is grudgingly permitted to give to the older studies, comes out of college unfit for anything except the particular task which he has been taught to perform. As President Jordan has shown, we are no longer getting scientists even, with a true love for science as science. So it does seem as though there was something wrong. If that is so, we may well study the past, consider how it was that the classical course got itself established, and dwell somewhat on the fact that great men have championed it and been produced by it—men with a sort of general fitness, with an ability to turn their powers in several directions, men with an adaptation, not perhaps to any special task, but to life itself. As the author of the address already quoted from well says: "The business of life is not business, but life". That is a truth which the reformers persistently ignore.

There does not seem to be any reason why the friends and lovers of liberal studies should assume an apologetic attitude, or allow themselves to be put on the defensive. It is not necessary for them to prove the soundness of their theories, for they have proved themselves, supported as they are by a great body of the highest sort of testimony, and by the experience of the race. It is the innovators who are on the defensive—it is they who must prove that their experiment has succeeded. Right reason, too, is on the side of those who, like the Amherst men, would make at least some approach to the old curriculum. The mistake of those who would continue things as they are is that they look at the matter solely from the point of view of the supposed good of the college, their idea being to make the college popular and to attract large numbers of students. But the college does not exist

for itself, but for those to whom it ministers. The question thus is, not what is good for the institution, but what is good for the young people who attend it. Obviously what they need most of all is a general training in the fundamentals, discipline, and as much culture as they can get. They must be brought into contact with the great minds of the race, with the treasures of art and literature. Not mere knowledge, but command of one's powers, is the thing to be sought. In this case, as in so many other cases, service of others is service of self. And so what is best for the pupil is, after all, best for the college. "The true university of these days", says Carlyle, "is a collection of books". The man who is not brought into intimate contact with books in his youth, who has not learned to love them and how to use them, suffers a loss which it is almost impossible to make good. So great is the sin of those who would divert the college boy from the library to the laboratory. That college which is true to its mission and function, which gives the best and most inspiring instruction in the essentials, and which sets and maintains a high standard, will never lack for patrons. The appeal of such an institution will, we may be sure, win an enthusiastic response. It will not only deserve success, but it will achieve it.

From the reply of the Trustees to the Class of 1885 we make a few quotations.

We agree with you that the function of Amherst College is to train its students by means of the liberal arts and sciences for a more abundant life and not for a larger wage. It should not attempt technical, vocational or professional education. Amherst has always regarded both the humanities and the sciences as necessary to a complete education and the true foundation for intellectual discipline and for character.

A liberal education is not complete unless it enters several fields of learning. The value of the ancient classics, that is, the Greek and Latin languages and literatures, is recognized. But there are other knowledges that are requisite to a liberal education. Science, which has so developed in the last fifty years as to be a new creation, is a discipline, is a knowledge that every educated man should have. This, indeed is recognized in your address when you say, "All would agree that some knowledge of science is part of a liberal education", that "in any teaching of the experience of the race, the sciences have a necessary place". But history, philosophy, mathematics, political science, economics, music, the literature of one's own tongue, German and Romance languages and literatures, certainly a liberally educated man should know something of these great experiences of the human race. The curriculum includes all these subjects, and more than half of the choices of the students are made from among them . . . The degree of bachelor of science will not be offered to classes entering after 1913, but only the one degree of bachelor of arts. As now arranged, the course leading to this degree is a better training for technical studies than the course that led to bachelor of science. Four years of Latin will be required of all for entrance. Two years of an ancient language and two years of science are in the future to be required in the college course, instead of one year each in classics and science, as in the past. Hitherto half the College took two years of the classics and half two years in science, a part taking both. In future all

will take both studies for two years. Amherst does not look on any man as educated unless he has been taught to interpret the problems of his own day through the lessons of the past and has received a knowledge of classic literature, philosophy and civilization, gaining discipline in the expression of his own tongue through the mental process of translation. Neither does Amherst look on any man to-day as fully trained for modern life who has not learned the methods of the laboratory and laid a secure foundation in science.

With the requirement of a preparation of four years of Latin and of two years of an ancient language in college, Amherst is definitely on the basis of a modified classical course. It is to be regretted that the requirement of Greek cannot be made, since so few preparatory schools teach it. But the College believes in Greek, believes in its value for discipline, for the culture and for the wide horizon opened to the student by knowledge of the vital past on which the literature, the institutions, the life of to-day are founded and without which they cannot be fully understood. To encourage the study of Greek, plans are being made to establish a classical lectureship, and a number of honorary scholarships for students fitted in Greek.

The Amherst graduate, with these plans and policies in full force, will have offered four years of Latin or Greek or both, at entrance; he will have had in college two years of an ancient language and two years at least of science; he will have a reading knowledge of German and a Romance language; he will have pursued three subjects for three years and one subject for two years; he will have had the choice, besides the requirements of classics, sciences, mathematics, and modern languages, of philosophy, including metaphysics and psychology, history, economics, political science and literature; he will have had abundant opportunity to interest himself in college activities and athletics, and he will not have been permitted to overdo in either.

REVIEW

Syntax of Early Latin. Vol. I. The Verb. By Charles E. Bennett, Boston: Allyn and Bacon (1910). Pp. xix 506. \$4.00.

(Concluded from page 7.)

The bibliographies scattered throughout the book are not intended to be complete, and the question of completeness is one on which there may well be differences of opinion. In many cases, however, a greater degree of completeness would have rendered the book more useful. In the citation of titles there is a certain negligence which ought not to appear in a work of reference. Some results of my examination of the book will illustrate what I mean. At p. 9 (Omission of the Verb), E. Baumann's *De Terentiano Verbi substantivi Usu*, 1890, might have been added, especially since the treatment of this subject by Professor Bennett is very inadequate. On the Future Indicative, p. 38, the date of Sjögren's well known work is given as 1904; the correct date, 1906, occurs at p. 18, n. At p. 60 the date (1895) of C. Lindskog's work on conditional sentences is

omitted, and the same is true of all four monographs cited on p. 79. On *ante quam* and *prius quam* Hullihen's dissertation is mentioned (p. 104) with no date or place. The date is given on p. 324, but p. 104 is the proper place for it. In connection with *ante quam* and *prius quam* there is no mention of R. Methner's useful article, *Der Modusgebrauch bei antequam und priusquam*, etc. (Neue Jahrbücher 20 [1907]; cf. especially pp. 324 ff.). To the bibliography of the Subjunctive in *Repudiating Questions* (p. 186) should be added E. Boeckel, *Exercitationum Plautin. Specimen*, 1872. Another article of F. Cramer's might well be added to that already mentioned on p. 202, since it is later than the one cited. I mean his *Zu alten Optat. und Konjunktivformen im Latein* (Gymnasium 8 [1890]. 701-710). On the Sequence of Tenses, p. 338, an inferior dissertation by Wirtfeld is cited, but no mention is made of a much better and later article: C. Sigmund, *De Coincidentia eiusque Usu Plautino et Terent.*, Diss. Philolog. Vindobon. 4 (1893). 39-98. O. Seyffert's views are always worthy of consideration and he might be referred to at pp. 340-341, Sequence after Historical tenses; cf. Seyffert's review of Wirtfeld in *Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift* for 1889, 690 ff. The date (1871) of V. Loch's work on the imperative, p. 348, is omitted—also that of J. Stahl's dissertation on the same subject (1886). At p. 366 P. Barth's name appears as 'Bartsch'—probably an analogy formation from Votsch just above! A. Funck's article, *Die Auslassung des Subjectspron. im Accusativ cum Infin.*, etc. (Jahn's Jahrb. 121 [1880]. 725-734) ought to be cited on pp. 383 and 396. On the Gerundive, p. 441, I miss a reference to P. Persson, *De Origine et Pi primigenia Gerundii et Gerundivi Lat.*, Upsala, 1900. But it would be profitless to give more illustrations of this defect. In general there seems to be a lack of system in the citation of authorities. Dates are sometimes given, sometimes omitted, sometimes given wrongly; titles are often inadequately presented; author's names are sometimes given in complete form, more often with not even one initial. This last defect may lead to error when there are two Brugmanns, Schneiders, etc.

To give any adequate idea of the actual results of the book would require far more space than THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY can allow. Every chapter would call for detailed discussion. It is possible, therefore, to mention only a few points which I have noted in a somewhat rapid reading of the book.

The half-page on the Omission of the Verb could be much extended (p. 9). We are told that the "verb is frequently omitted in Early Latin, particularly forms of *sum*, especially in the function of auxiliary", but no examples are given of other omissions than those of parts of *sum*. Any good

edition of a play of Plautus or Terence would have furnished many illustrations of the omission of other verbs, and the phenomenon is an important one not only in the history of Latin syntax, but also for its bearing on the principles of word-order. The so-called Praesens Tabulare is said to have "originated in inscriptional records" (p. 17), but, even if we recognize such a use, it can hardly have originated in inscriptional records, although it may have developed or become conventional there. In the discussion of expressions like *Rud. 677 cesso ego eas consolari*, Professor Bennett says that, if they are questions, "they are true deliberatives". I cannot see any deliberative force. They seem to me to be questions of surprise at oneself—rather exclamations than real questions. Certainly they are rhetorical rather than deliberative. No attention is paid (p. 30) to the striking contrast of time which is always present and usually expressed with the cases of the customary imperfect. This contrast is an important feature of the usage. When Professor Bennett adds (p. 31) that the 'Aktionsart' of *solebam*, *mos erat*, etc. is aoristic, "because it is illogical to speak of a custom as being customary", it seems to me that he is wrong. The usage may be illogical, but language is often far from logical, and, remembering that *solebam*, etc., are mere auxiliaries to denote that the action of the dependent infinitive, etc., is customary, we must classify under the latter head. English expressions such as 'It used to be his way' are just as illogical. In the same way the difficulty recognized on page 34 of discerning continued (better 'progressive') action in the cases of *eram* can often be resolved by noticing that this colorless verb may reflect the tense force of other verbs in the same context. By the application of this principle Professor Bennett's list of aoristic imperfects might be much curtailed. But the subject is certainly a difficult one. At page 58 Professor Bennett takes such participles as that in *Most. 235 iam ista . . . apsumpta res erit* in an adjectival sense (against Sjögren, who interprets as a future perfect tense). The author's view seems to me correct, but it is another difficult problem. There is an interesting passage in Quintilian (7.9.10) which shows that the distinction of adjectival from verbal force in these forms was not easy for the Romans themselves: *sed ablativo ipsi . . . inest naturalis amphibolia. caelo decurrit aperto: utrum per apertum caelum, an cum apertum esset?* This passage is equally applicable to the subject of participles (p. 440).

In the discussion of conditions (pp. 60 ff.) no attention is paid to the order of protasis and apodosis, although there is a strong tendency toward fixed order in some forms: thus, e. g. protases in the present indicative introduced by *nisi si* almost invariably follow the apodosis. Three cases are cited (p. 62) in which a protasis in the present indicative

is followed by an apodosis in the imperfect. These are said to be "obviously elliptical". The sense in which we are to understand "elliptical" would be clear, if a reference to p. 36 had been added. The imperfects here are of the type in which an act begun in the past is continued in the present: cf. *As. 452 sed si domist, Demaenetus volebam* with *v. 392 . . . Quid quaeritas? Demaenetus volebam*. The case cited from *Ennius Trag. 115* should be cut out, since it does not rest on good authority: cf. Marx's *Auctor ad Herennium 2,24.38*. Vahlen rightly rejects it. The other case (*Phorm. 1023*) is different from that in the *Asinaria*, since the condition is *generalizing*. Under the head of *Protasis* in the *Pluperfect Indicative*, p. 73, the statement is made that "si has a pronounced temporal force" in *Hec. 181 si quando ad eam accesserat, fugere*, and *Cato fr. 35.3 (Jordan) Si quis strenue fecerat, donabam*. The temporal force arises rather from *quando* in the first example and from the distributive force of the *quis* in the second.

The terminology adopted is not always happy, and shows at times a decided tendency to become Teutonic. It is too early at present, however, to hope for anything like general agreement in the terms which are to be applied to a myriad of usages which are still subjects of investigation. Time will probably settle this question and the fittest will survive. And yet nothing seems to be gained by retaining so vague a term as potential (p. 197) for a variety of usages which are not potential in any proper sense of the word. "The 'Should-Would' Potential" is even worse. Why not use some term which will bring out the fact that the "statement is represented as dependent on some condition expressed or understood"? 'Should-Would' is certainly too clumsy. The same may be said of the 'May' Potential and the 'Can-Could' Potential. Surely the English language is capable of producing some term as expressive as these and much more convenient.

The account of parataxis—especially pp. 209-210, 244-245—seems to me unsatisfactory. To say that *Ausculta; scies* is paratactic and that in *Tibi impero abeas* the *abeas* is "Just as truly subordinate as *ut abeas* in *Tibi impero ut abeas*" seems to me to contradict one of the main criteria of parataxis: the absence of a formal sign of hypotaxis. If *Impero abeas* is not paratactic, then 'I fear, he will die' is not paratactic, and the latter is given by Professor Bennett as an example of parataxis in English. The question concerns the definition and nature of parataxis, and Professor Bennett seems to use the term in too narrow a sense. Nobody doubts that there are various degrees in the closeness (or looseness) with which two verbs in parataxis may be related—*Ausculta; scies* represents a looser relation than *Impero abeas*, to use the same examples—but until

we are in a position to draw closer lines among the different grades of relation, it is certainly better to group the type *Impero abeas* with *Ausculta; scies* than with clauses introduced by an expressed particle. The juxtapositions ordinarily included under parataxis are not, strictly speaking, synonymous with independence, but they are much less synonymous with dependence. The cases cited on pp. 244-245 to prove that many subjunctive clauses without introductory particles are subordinate merely prove that the relation between the two verbs may be very close. In *Nolo ames*, for example, the negative force is felt in the whole combination. It is true, as Professor Bennett says, that *ames* is not independent, but it is equally true that it is not subordinate in the sense that *amare* in *Nolo te amare* would be subordinate. We shall, therefore, be forced to classify *Nolo ames* as parataxis or else to use 'subordinate' in a new sense. Nor is it at all certain that *Nolo ames* "is modelled on" *volo ames*. It is at least equally possible that the negative form developed from *Ne ames volo* or a similar expression: cf. the examples on pp. 168-169.

One result of the persistent syntactical work of the last two or three decades has been the 'discovery of new meanings of the subjunctive until that unfortunate mode has become so overloaded that it staggers like a ship in a gale. The tendency has been a perfectly natural one and is by no means confined to work on the subjunctive. Careful description and classification of functions must precede inferences concerning basic or original meanings, and, when in any department of syntax a scholar has unearthed a new or insufficiently recognized function, the joy of discovery impels him to trace its origin further back than the facts really warrant. It is a human weakness. Thus we have a little family of pet subjunctives. Professor Bennett's favorite is the 'stipulative' (263 ff.), whose claims to recognition he urges with all his accustomed skill. But if we apply Professor Bennett's own method to this question, our results will differ from his. Speaking of the so-called 'anticipatory' subjunctive (p. 305) he says: ". . . this theory seems quite unnecessary, and, in view of the great uncertainty of the presence of an anticipatory at all in Latin, extremely problematic". So, again, on p. 326, in the discussion of *ante quam*, he says: "An idea of expectation is, of course, often present in these clauses, but that is a necessary result of the meanings of the particles introducing them. The positive evidence in favor of the existence of an anticipatory subjunctive in Latin is too slight to warrant its recognition here". Arguing against Bottek's theory that characteristic clauses originate in an interrogative potential use (p. 289, n.), he remarks: "any such use of the potential is unknown in independent clauses in Latin,

and therefore practically impossible in dependent clauses". These are three wise remarks. The argument in condensed form is: that scholars are prone to read into the subjunctive mode a function which really belongs to the context, especially to the contiguous particles, and that no original use of the mode can be regarded as very probable unless we can point to a case of that use in the independent or in the paratactic stage. How is it with the 'stipulative'? Professor Bennett exhibits self restraint in his refusal to claim for the 'stipulative' a place among the original meanings of the subjunctive. But can this function be attached to the subjunctive even in subordinate clauses? The examples put forward are far from convincing. The rendering proposed for Phorm. 633 *quid vis dari Tibi in manum ut erus his desistat litibus, Haec hinc faces sat, etc.*, is 'on the understanding that', etc. Many clauses introduced by *ut* (*ne*) undoubtedly expressed a proposed agreement, but who can say whether this force resides in the subjunctive? That the Romans rather connected the 'stipulative' force with the particle is shown by efforts to make the particle more precise as *ita . . . ut, sic . . . ut, eo modo (pacto) . . . ut, ea lege . . . ut, ea condicione . . . ut, etc.*: cf. Professor Bennett's own examples, Epid. 470, Men. 53, Stich. 195, And. 148, etc. The truth is that *ut* and *ne* were capable of so many shades of meaning, or, to put it differently, were so lacking in precision of meaning, that they were often loose approximations of the speaker's thought. This is characteristic of colloquial language and it is this that appears in the 'stipulative' clauses introduced by mere *ut* or *ne*. An advance in definiteness is marked by *ita (sic) . . . ut*, a still greater advance in *ea lege . . . ut*, etc., and it would be better to classify such clauses as purpose, substantive clauses etc. Professor Bennett himself remarks (p. 267, n.2) that "these substantive stipulative clauses are of course very closely related to the substantive clauses considered above on p. 236 f.", i. e. to the clauses which are usually called substantive *ut*- or *ne*- clauses. No difference in the function of the subjunctive is apparent to me in Bacch. 1041 *duae condiciones sunt, vel ut aurum perdas vel ut amator perierit* ('stipulative', according to Professor Bennett), and And. 168 *tuomst officium has ut adsimiles nuptias* (substantive clause, according to Professor Bennett). In the first passage the clauses define *condiciones*, a 'stipulative' noun; in the second, a non-'stipulative' noun. But this does not prove a difference in the force of the subjunctive nor does it warrant separate categories. The length to which even Professor Bennett may go in reading the meaning of the context into a modal form appears at p. 354, where the *imperative* is said to denote a stipulation in Asin. 231 *atque ea lege, si alias attulerit, tu vale.*

The general impression of one who toils through the illustrations of 'anticipatory', 'stipulative', and 'iterative' subjunctives cited from Republican Latin is one of extreme doubt. We are inclined to deal with these subjects as the famous Irish historian dealt with that of snakes in his native land and write: There are none!

A general work in which so many facts and theories must find a place cannot be expected to satisfy every reader at every point, and the reviewer naturally dwells on those features which do not satisfy him, so that he seems to neglect the real excellences of the book. These excellences will be found to be numerous by anybody who has occasion to consult Professor Bennett's work. Here at length we have for Early Latin a book containing a rich and convenient collection of the facts together with a clear summary and an honest critique of the theories put forth to explain the facts—material which will afford an ample basis for independent conclusions on the part of any reader who will take the trouble to work through Professor Bennett's pages. Of the great usefulness of the book there can be no doubt, and its positive value is such that its conclusions must be reckoned with by all who are interested in that history of Latin syntax which is being slowly but surely worked out.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

ARTHUR L. WHEELER.

CORRESPONDENCE

In May last, in the woods of Ogontz School, at Ogontz, Pa., as a means of instructing the young women of the school in certain phases of Roman life, a feast was held, presided over, as the announcement card stated, "ab ovo usque ad mala, by the Roman deities, Ceres (Wheat), Fornax (Ovens), Flora (Flowers), Glaucus (Fishes), Pales (Cattle), Pomona (Fruits)". Each deity was appropriately costumed, to represent his or her mission to mankind, Ceres with sheaves of wheat, Pales with a skin over his shoulder, etc. They reclined at tables decorated as far as possible in Roman fashion. The air was perfumed with myrrh and frankincense. The guests, about 150 in number, sat in a circle about the deities. Those representing the deities conversed, each god upholding the supreme importance of his (her) own functions and the benefits thereby bestowed on mankind. The courses were announced by a double horn. Spoons only were supplied to the guests. Napkins having pictures of Ceres, Pomona, Roman emperors, palaces, ruins, etc., were given to the guests as they left.

The courses were as follows: eggs, devilled with Spanish peppers; crabs served on a huge scallop shell; chicken pie; salad with vegetables and fruits known to the Romans; ices served with a sauce composed of fruits known to the Romans. Apples were rolled to the guests; cornucopias of confections known to the Romans were distributed. Wreaths of flowers were placed on the more distinguished guests. The servants were clad, as far as possible, as Roman slaves were. The students

seemed to grasp the limitations of a Roman dinner and to get some idea of its elaborateness. A Winchester College Latin post-prandial prayer was read at the end of the feast.

THE OGONTZ SCHOOL.

WINIFRED AUSTIN.

Lack of space crowded out of Volume 4 the menu card of the dinner of The Classical Association of the Atlantic States, held at Princeton on April 21 last. We understand that the card was prepared, in whole or in large part, by Professor George D. Kellogg, now at Union College.

CENA

CONSOCIATIONIS CLASSICAE
CIVITATUM ATLANTICARUM

"Urbis amatorem Fuscum salvere iubemus ruris
amatores."

—Q. H. F.

ORDO FERCULORUM

OVA ACIPENSERIS GARO CONDITA

"....Mixtum ius est....
....garo de sucis piscis Hiberi."

—Q. H. F.

OLIVAE

CUCUMERES CONDITIVI

"Me pascunt olivae
me cichorea levesque malvae."

—Q. H. F.

ASSA AGNINA CUM MENTAE SUCO

"vilos et agninae, tribus ursis quod satis esset."

—Q. H. F.

NOVI PHASELI LONGI BUTYRO PINQUES

"O quando faba Pythagorae cognata simulque
uncta satis pingui ponentur holuscula lardo?"

—Q. H. F.

SOLANA TUBEROSA MORE PARISIACO COCTA

"Quid censes munera terrae?"

—Q. H. F.

ACETARIA

"Claudere quae cenas lactuca solebat avorum."

—Martialis.

CREMOR LACTIS CONCRETUS

"Nectareum florem lactis glacieque concretum
ne spernas invenis."

—O. Gratius!

CRUSTULA

"Ut pueris olim dant crustula blandi doctores,
elementa velint ut discere prima."

—Q. H. F.

CALICULUS

"Postremo e tostis succedat potio baccis,
quas tibi Mocha ferax e littore mittit Eoo,
sorbillat: dulcis stomachum bene mollet haustus."

—LEO XIII P. M.

